We introduce an exploration scheme aimed at learning advertiser clickthrough rates in sponsored search auctions with minimal effect on advertiser incentives. The scheme preserves both the current ranking and pricing policies of the search engine and only introduces one set of parameters which control the rate of exploration. These parameters can be set so as to allow enough exploration to learn advertiser click-through rates over time, but also eliminate incentives for advertisers to alter their currently submitted bids. When advertisers have much more information than the search engine, we show that although this goal is not achievable, incentives to deviate can be made arbitrarily small by appropriately setting the exploration rate. Given that advertisers do not alter their bids, we bound revenue loss due to exploration.
of dollars in revenue. Most sponsored search auctions display a list of advertisements on the sidebar or other sections of a search engine's results page, ranked by some function of advertisers' revealed willingness-to-pay for every click on their ad. The advertisers in turn pay the search engine for every click their ad receives. While several pricing schemes have been circulated in the literature [10] , by far the most popular is a generalization of second-price auctions, under which each advertiser pays the lowest bid that is sufficient to ensure that the ad remain in its current slot. Typically the number of available slots for advertisements on the first search page is fixed, and thus only high ranking advertisements are displayed.
An essential part of both designing sponsored search auction mechanisms and bidding in them is the knowledge of the probability that a given ad is clicked each time it is displayed in a particular slot for a particular search query or keyword. This probability is known as the click-through rate or CTR of the ad. Knowledge of these click-through rates helps advertisers determine optimal bidding behavior. CTRs can also be an integral part of the ad ranking policy. For example, it is common for policies to rank bidders by the product of their bid and some function of their relevance, a slot-independent measure of CTR. Throughout the paper, we assume that CTRs do not change over time.
Most of the existing literature on sponsored search auctions treats CTRs as known. When advertisers first enter the system, however, their CTRs are not yet known either by the search engine or even by the advertisers themselves, and can only be estimated over time based on the observed clicks. Observations are inherently limited to slots in which ads appear, and estimates are generally poor for advertisers with low rank that do not usually appear at all. Furthermore, without the assumption of factorable CTRs, little can be said about CTRs of an ad in slots in which it has not previously appeared (or has appeared only a small number of times). Thus there is a need for an exploration policy that periodically perturbs the current slate of displayed ads, showing some in alternate slots and occasionally displaying those ads that are ranked below the last slot. Ideally, this exploration policy should not be difficult to incorporate into the current sponsored search mechanisms. Additionally, if the advertisers' bids have reached an equilibrium, the exploration policy should, when possible, eliminate the incentives for bidders to change their bids, thereby destabilizing the auction. Such destabilization can result in negative user and advertiser experience, as well as unnecessary loss in revenue to the search engine, and can make exploration harder to control.
There are, of course, trivial ways of exploring while maintaining equilibrium bids. For example, the search engine could rank, display, and price the ads as usual with probability α, and rank the ads randomly (say, choosing uniformly among all possible rankings) with probability 1 − α. The problem with this approach is that in order to maintain equilibrium bids, the search engine must not charge for any clicks received during exploration, which could clearly lead to a significant loss of revenue.
In this paper, we address the problem of learning the click-through rates for each ad in every slot. Our primary goal is to maintain an equilibrium bid configuration if the bidders did indeed play according to an equilibrium prior to exploration, while allowing the search engine to charge for all clicks received during exploration. When advertisers have significantly more knowledge than the search engine, we provide bounds on the amount that any advertiser could gain by deviating. This incentive to deviate can be minimized by reducing exploration, at the cost of slowing down the process of learning the CTRs. Additionally, we bound the revenue loss that the search engine incurs due to exploration, as compared to maintaining a policy based on current estimates of CTRs.
A similar problem has been addressed by Pandey and Olston [13] and Gonen and Pavlov [7] . The former work addresses the learning problem without considering advertiser incentives. The latter addresses both. Our model differs from existing ones in three primary ways:
1. We avoid imposing a particular ranking policy or introducing a new pricing scheme so that changes to existing systems are minimal. 2. The data gathered by our approach can be incorporated into general learning algorithms using sample selection debiasing techniques [8] . 3. We avoid the standard but unrealistic assumption that click-through rates can be factored into advertiser-and slot-specific components.
Notation and Definitions
We consider an auction for a particular keyword in which there are N advertisers (alternately called bidders or players) placing bids. Since our analysis can be repeated for each keyword, the restriction to a single keyword is without loss of generality.
(Indeed, the analysis can even be generalized to incorporate arbitrary context information, as long as the number of contexts is finite and advertisers may submit separate bids for each [5] . In Sect. 9 we generalize some of our results to the continuous context setting.) We assume that the search engine has K slots with non-negligible CTRs. Throughout the discussion on incentives, we assume that the CTRs depend only on the ad being displayed and the slot in which it is shown. Thus, we use c s i to denote the true CTR of player i in slot s. We assume that for each player i, c s i > c t i whenever 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K. For convenience, we define c s i = 0 for s > K and s < 1. In most of our analysis we deal explicitly with estimated click-through rates; the search engine estimates are denoted byĉ s i , whereas the advertiser i's estimates are denoted byc s i . Finally, we let v i denote the value of a click to player i. In other words, v i is the expected amount that player i will gain from a click before considering payments.
For now we assume that prior to the exploration process, advertisers are ranked according to their bid b i multiplied by a weight w i which is an increasing function of their estimated relevance scores for the particular keyword. Setting this weight equal to the advertiser's relevance recovers the standard rank-by-revenue model; setting it equal to 1 recovers rank-by-bid [11] . Each advertiser pays a price per click equal to the lowest bid that maintains his current position; thus the price paid by bidder i in rank s is p s i = w s+1 b s+1 /w i . Without loss of generality, assume that advertisers are indexed in the order in which they are ranked when playing equilibrium, i.e. advertiser i is in slot i in the ranking.
The relevance score of an advertiser, which we denote by e i , can be thought of as an average CTR over all slots for the given keyword. We might choose to define this relevance as We assume that prior to exploration the advertisers converge to a symmetric Nash equilibrium, a variant of Nash equilibrium introduced simultaneously by Varian [15] and Edelman et al. [4] . We slightly alter the standard definition to take into account CTR estimates as follows. Existence of at least one symmetric Nash Equilibrium was proved in a slightly different setting than ours by Börgers et al. [1] . Their proof applies essentially without change to our setting. More details can be found in Appendix A. 1 By assuming that bidders converge to a symmetric Nash equilibrium prior to exploration, we are implicitly assuming that advertisers are myopic in the sense that they care only about their short term revenue. In particular, we assume that advertisers do not attempt to bid in such a way as to fool the auctioneer into setting the parameters of the exploration algorithm more favorably in the future. This assumption is quite natural if we envision the auctioneer setting the parameters of the exploration algorithm uniformly across large groups of auctions, as might be done in practice. (See the related comments at the end of Sect. 3.)
Definition 1

An Algorithm for Exploration
We begin by describing a simple algorithm for learning click-through rates. Below (in Sect. 4) we show that we can set parameters of this algorithm in such a way as to minimize or entirely eliminate incentives for advertisers to deviate from a preexploration SNE. Our key condition will be that throughout the entire run of the algorithm the prices which the advertisers pay are fixed to their pre-exploration equilibrium prices.
Algorithm 1
The k-swap algorithm.
Input: r k i for all 1 ≤ i, k ≤ K for all queries on the given keyword do Randomly select a k ∈ {1, . . . , K} for i = 1 to min{k, K − k + 1} do Set S i ← 1 with probability r k i , S i ← 0 otherwise end for
Swap the ads in slots i and i
The algorithm, which we call k-swap (Algorithm 1), starts by ranking ads by the product of bid and weight as usual, and repeatedly chooses pairs of ads to swap in order to explore. In particular, each time the given keyword receives an impression (i.e. each time a query is made on the keyword), a swapping distance k ∈ {1, . . . , K} is chosen from some distribution (e.g. uniformly at random). The algorithm calculates or looks up a swapping probability for each pair of slots s and s + k that are a distance k apart. (The method for choosing these probabilities will be discussed in Sect. 4.) Finally, the algorithm uses this set of swapping probabilities to decide which (if any) pair of ads to swap.
We must be careful about how pairs of ads are chosen to be swapped so we can avoid swapping the same ad more than once on a single query. Let S i denote the event that the ads in slots i and i + k are swapped and let r k i = Pr(S i ) be the probability that this event occurs. We have
To avoid conflicting swaps, we can set Pr(S i |S i−k ) = 0, which implies that
, which is no greater than one as long as we enforce that r k i−k + r k i ≤ 1. For the purposes of this algorithm, all ads with rank K + 1, . . . , N can be thought of as sharing slot K + 1. Thus whenever an ad in slot s ≤ K is chosen to swap with slot K + 1, any ad with rank K + 1, . . . , N could be displayed in slot s. We do not discuss how the algorithm might decide which losing ad to display, but one could imagine giving preference to ads that have not often been displayed in the past.
One way in which the k-swap algorithm might be combined with the standard generalized second-price auctions is as follows:
1. Estimate bidder valuations from past data (e.g., using the methods described by Börgers et al. [1] However, in practice, it might be more reasonable to use an approach that does not rely on the need to accurately estimate bidder valuations. To eliminate this need (and simultaneously avoid giving bidders an incentive to try to fool the auctioneer into choosing more advantageous values for the swapping probabilities), Steps 1 and 2 can be replaced by a single step that sets the swapping probabilities to values for which the constraints in Theorem 2 would be satisfied for most "typical" auctions. This is the approach that we advocate in most practical settings.
Maintaining Equilibrium During Pairwise Swapping
In this section, we consider the effect on advertiser incentives of implementing an exploration policy that occasionally chooses pairs of ads that are k slots apart to swap or moves an undisplayed ad into slot K − k + 1 for some fixed value of k. By ensuring that advertisers do not have incentives to deviate from equilibrium bids for any fixed k, we ensure that the advertisers do not deviate throughout the entire run of k-swap.
We assume that the search engine bases the weights w i on the CTR estimatesĉ s i , and fix the prices paid by the advertisers through the entire run of k-swap. The updated CTR estimates obtained during exploration are only reported to advertisers after the algorithm completes. In practice, the algorithm may need to be run in multiple phases, interleaving exploration with updates of CTR estimates, and allowing sufficient time for advertisers to reach a new equilibrium after each phase.
Our assumptions raise a conceptual question: if the advertisers care about the real CTRs, how can we maintain incentives given only estimates? We posit that often advertisers do not know the CTRs any better than the search engine and formulate their own optimization problem (at least approximately) in terms of the estimates provided by the search engine; that is, we assume thatc s i =ĉ s i ∀i, s. We consider the case in which advertisers have additional information about their CTRs and provide bounds on their incentives to deviate as a result of exploration in Sect. 6 .
Since all analysis in this section is for a fixed value of k, we drop the superscript and use r i in place of r k i to denote the probability that ads i and i + k are swapped. These probabilities can be represented as multiples of r 1 , i.e. r i = α i r 1 . Then, if α i are set exogenously (for example, α i = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K), k-swap has only one tunable parameter, r 1 , for a fixed value of k. For convenience of notation, we define α i = 0 for all i < 1 and i > K − k + 1. In order to allow exploration of CTRs of all bidders, we let r K−k+1 designate the total probability that any losing bidder is swapped into slot K − k + 1. Let q s denote the probability that a losing bidder with rank K + 1 ≤ s ≤ N is displayed conditional on some losing ad being displayed; thus, the probability that a particular losing bidder s gets selected is q s r K−k+1 . We have that N s=K+1 q s = 1. Finally, define q max = max K+1≤s≤N q s . Once we add exploration, the effective estimate of CTR for advertiser i in slot s is no longerĉ s i . Rather, now with some probability r s−k the ad in slot s is moved to slot s − k, and with some probability r s the ad is moved to slot s + k. Then the new effective estimate of CTR of player i for rank s iŝ Let
is the marginal CTR loss of advertiser i in slot s when exploration is allowed. We now define the quantities J i,j and Z i which are used in Theorem 2:
To get some intuition about what these mean, note that r 1 J i,j is the difference between the marginal loss in expected payoff due to exploration that the advertiser i receives in slot j and the marginal loss in expected payoff due to exploration in slot i. Similarly, r 1 Z i is the difference between the marginal loss in payoff due to exploration that the advertiser i receives by switching to rank above K + 1 (and thereby not occupying any slot) and the marginal loss due to exploration in slot i.
The following result gives the conditions under which exploration does not incentivize advertisers to change their bids and characterizes the settings in which this is not possible.
Theorem 2 Assume that each advertiser i ∈ {1, . . . , K} strictly prefers his current slot to all others in equilibrium, i.e. the condition
Then for generic valuations and relevances there exists an r 1 > 0 such that no advertiser has incentive to deviate from the pre-exploration SNE bids once exploration is added. In particular, any r 1 satisfying the following set of conditions is sufficient:
Before moving on, let us examine the three terms inside the min in this bound. The first term simply enforces that for each ad, the sum of the probability that the ad is swapped to higher slot and the probability that the ad is swapped to a lower slot is no more than 1. The second term ensures that no ad that is displayed at equilibrium has incentive to provide a lower bid and no longer be displayed after swapping is introduced. The final term guarantees that no ad prefers to switch to another slot when swapping is introduced. Intuitively, if these conditions are satisfied, then the advertisers will remain in equilibrium when swapping is introduced.
The proof of Theorem 2, which can be found in Appendix B, is broken into three cases. First it is necessary to show that if the conditions in the theorem statement hold, advertisers 1, . . . , K have no incentive to alter their bids in order to switch to other ranks within 1, . . . , K. Next we must show that these advertisers have no incentives to alter their bids in order to move to slots lower than K. Finally, we show that advertisers ranked below slot K before exploration have no incentive to deviate.
To get some intuition about how the theorem can be applied and about the magnitude of r 1 , consider the following example. Suppose that prior to exploration each advertiser bids his value per click and pays the next highest bid. One can easily verify that this configuration constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which player 1 gets slot 1 and player 2 gets slot 2. Let us fix α 2 = 1, so r 1 = r 2 . Now we can determine the setting of r 1 that allows us to swap neighboring ads (k = 1) without introducing incentives to deviate during exploration. Applying the first constraint, we find the condition that r 1 ≤ 0.5 must hold. This is clearly necessary; ad 2 cannot be swapped up and down each with probability more than 0.5.
By the second constraint, since Z 1 = 1.5 and Z 2 = 0.5, we must have that r 1 ≤ 0.6. Finally, since J 1,2 = 0.5, we get the condition that r 1 ≤ 0.4. Combining the effects of these constraints, we see that we can set both swapping probabilities as high as 0.4 without giving any of the advertisers incentive to deviate during exploration.
Suppose we wished to increase the swapping probabilities to 0.4 + for some small positive to allow slightly more exploration. Then the new effective clickthrough rate for advertiser 1 at the top rank during exploration would beĉ 1 1 (0.6 − ) +ĉ 2 1 (0.4 + ) = 0.16 − 0.1 , while his effective click-through rate in the second rank would beĉ 1
Thus the expected payoff to advertiser 1 in rank 1 is (10 − 5)(0.16 − 0.1 ) = 0.8 − 0.5 , while his expected payoff in rank 2 is (10 − 2)(0.1) = 0.8, giving him incentive to deviate from his pre-exploration equilibrium bid.
As the example suggests, the bounds in Theorem 2 are close to tight. In fact, the bounds can be made tight simply by replacing q max with the conditional probability with which ad i would be selected if it were not in one of the top K ranks.
Learning Bounds
In this section, we bound the error of our estimated click-through rates for each advertiser in each slot after Q queries have been made on the given keyword. Let n i,s denote the number of times we have observed advertiser i in slot s, and let z i,s,j be the indicator random variable which is 1 if ad i is clicked the j th time it appears in slot s, and 0 otherwise. Finally, let π k i,s be the probability that ad i is displayed at slot s when we are swapping ads that are k slots apart, as discussed in Sect. 4 .
To simplify the presentation of results, we assume that the swapping distance k is drawn uniformly at random from {1, . . . , K} for each query, but the extension to arbitrary distributions is straight-forward. 
Furthermore, with probability at least 1 − δ, for all i and s, we have that
Proof Let x 1 , . . . , x n be independent random variables, with x z = 1 if a click is observed the zth time that ad i is displayed in slot s, and x z = 0 otherwise.
Thus we can apply Hoeffding's inequality [9] to these random variables to bound the error of our estimation of the click-through rate of ad i in slot s given that we have observed the ad in this slot n i,s times. Specifically, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability 1 − δ ,
We can apply Hoeffding's inequality once again to bound the deviation of n i,s from its expectation. We find that with probably 1 − δ ,
Setting δ = δ /(N K) and applying the union bound completes the proof.
Thus as the number of queries Q grows, our estimates of the CTR vectors for each advertiser converge to the true CTR vectors.
Bounds on the Incentives of "Omniscient" Advertisers
If players have much more information about the actual click-through rates than the search engine, it is unlikely that we can entirely eliminate incentives of advertisers to change their bids during exploration. However, if we can bound the error in our estimates of the click-through rates, we can also bound how much advertisers can gain by deviating. When incentives to deviate are small, we may reasonably expect advertisers to maintain their equilibrium bids, since computing the new optimal bids can be costly. The search engine may further dull benefits from deviation by charging a small fee to advertisers when they change their bids.
From this point on, we assume that the error in search engine estimates of the CTRs is uniformly bounded by ; that is, |c s i −ĉ s i | ≤ for every i and s. Assume that r k 1 were set such that the bidders have no incentive to change their bids if they useĉ s i as their CTR estimates. We now establish how much incentive they have to deviate if they know their actual CTR c s i , that is,c s i = c s i ; we call such advertisers "omniscient".
Theorem 4 The most that any omniscient advertiser can gain by deviating in expectation per impression is
Proof For all i and s,
and so c i i ≥ĉ i i − . Now consider a player i deviating to slot (or rank) j :
The theorem statement follows.
This bound has the intuitive property that as our CTR estimates improve, the bound on incentives to deviate from equilibrium bids improves as well. (Note that given r k 1 the actual payoffs to deviation are not affected as we learn unless we also publicize the learned information.) It is also intuitive, however, that incentives diminish if the exploration probabilities fall. This motivates the following alternate bound which shows that we can make the incentives to deviate arbitrarily small even for omniscient advertisers by appropriately setting r k 1 .
Theorem 5 The most that any omniscient advertiser can gain by deviating in expectation per impression is
Proof Consider incentives for some player i for deviating to slot j and let
Then, 
Bounds on Revenue Loss Due to Exploration
We now assume that the advertisers play according to the symmetric Nash equilibrium that was played prior to exploration and, as in the previous section, assume that the errors of the search engine's estimates of CTRs are uniformly bounded by with high probability. Given these assumptions, the theorem that follows bounds the loss in revenue due entirely to exploration.
Theorem 6
The maximum expected loss to the search engine revenue per impression due to exploration is bounded by
Proof Fix the swapping constant k. For any player i, the change in revenue can be bounded as
The inequality in the penultimate step above follows by the bound on the error in CTRs, as well as by the fact that r i + r i−k ≤ 1. Summing over all players and taking the max over all swapping distances yields the bound.
Special Cases
In this section we study the problem of exploration while maintaining a preexploration symmetric Nash equilibrium in two special cases. In both cases, it is only necessary to swap adjacent pairs of ads in order to learn reasonable estimates of advertiser CTRs.
Factorable Click-Through Rates
The first special case we consider is the commonly studied setting where c s i = e i c s ; that is, CTRs are factored into a product of advertiser relevance and slot-specific factors. To simplify presentation, we assume c s is known and e i is to be learned for all advertisers, since there are far more data for estimating c s than e i .
Maintaining Equilibrium Under these assumptions, using k-swap may seem strange; after all, we can learn e i for all advertisers i ≤ K just as well by leaving them in their current slots! The only problem to be addressed then is to learn CTRs of losing bidders. Consequently, if we truly believe that CTRs are factorable, we need only do adjacent-ad swapping (k = 1) and can set r 1 = · · · = r K−1 = 0 and only allow r K > 0. In this case, we need not worry about deviations by advertisers in slots 1, . . . , K − 1 to alternative slots 1, . . . , K − 1, since the effective CTRs for these deviations are unchanged. Additionally, no advertiser wants to deviate to slot K, since the CTR in this slot is strictly lower than it was before exploration, and no advertiser ranked K + 1, . . . , N wants a higher slot, since their effective CTRs increase. Thus we need only consider the incentives of the advertiser in slot K. It is not difficult to verify that the condition under which exploration does not affect advertiser K's incentives is
and we can find an r K > 0 when c
There is, however, another possible scenario in which exploration might be useful under the factorable CTR assumption. Suppose that we initially posit the factorable CTR model, but want to verify whether this is really the case. To do so, we can use adjacent-ad swapping to form multiple estimates of e i using data from multiple adjacent slots. By comparing these estimates, we can vet our current model while also improving our CTR estimates for losing bidders.
Since CTR is factorable, our analysis need only consider the effective slot-specific CTRs, which we assume are known, .
By setting the swapping probabilities in this manner, the effective CTRs in slots 2, . . . , K − 1 are unchanged when exploration is added. We can now simplify the bounds and characterization of Theorem 2. In particular, the precondition of the theorem and the second bound on r 1 need only to hold for i = 1. Furthermore, it can be shown that in the factorable setting, the precondition
)c j always holds in the minimum revenue SNE [15] for generic valuations and relevances (see Appendix C for a formal statement and proof). Putting everything together, we can prove the following result in the factorable setting.
Theorem 7 Consider the setting in which CTRs are factorable into the product of advertiser relevance and a slot-specific CTR factor. Let r i be defined as in (D.5) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , K}. Assume that advertiser 1 strictly prefers his current slot to all others in equilibrium, i.e. the condition (v
1 − p 1 1 )c 1 > (v 1 − p j 1 )c j holds for all 2 ≤ j ≤ K whenever J 1,j > 0
. Then for generic valuations and relevances there exists an r 1 > 0 such that no advertiser has an incentive to deviate from the pre-exploration SNE bids once exploration is added. Any r 1 for which the following conditions hold is sufficient:
where
and Z i is defined according to (2) .
The proof of Theorem 7 is provided in Appendix D.
Learning Bounds As in the general setting, it is possible to derive learning bounds that show that as the number of observed queries grow, our estimates of the advertiser CTR vectors grow arbitrarily close to the true CTRs with high probability. As before, let n i,s denote the number of times we have observed advertiser i in slot s at the current fixed CTR estimates, and let z i,s,j be a random binary variable indicating whether or not the ad i was clicked on the j th time it appeared in slot s. We want this claim to hold for all N advertisers. Setting δ = δ/N and applying the union bound completes the proof.
Theorem 8 Suppose that CTRs can be factored into advertiser-dependent and slotdependent components. In other words, for all i and
Click-through Rates with Constant Slot Ratios
Next we consider adjacent-ad swapping (k = 1) for the case in which for each player i, the click-through rates have constant ratios for adjacent slots. That is, for all i and all 1 ≤ s ≤ K − 1, we assume that c s+1 i /c s i = γ i ≤ 1 where γ i is advertiser-dependent and unknown. Letγ i denote the search engine estimate of γ i and suppose as before that advertisers use these as their own estimates. Let α j = 1 for every j ∈ {2, . . . , K − 1}, so r 1 = r 2 = · · · = r K−1 . Additionally, let α K = min{(γ i − 1) 2 /q max , 1}.
Maintaining Equilibrium As in the previous section, we can considerably simplify the bounds and characterization of Theorem 2 in this special case. In particular, the first and second bounds on r 1 must hold, but the third bound on r 1 and the precondition need only to hold for i = 1 and i = K. 
Furthermore, assume that for all i such that Z i > 0, v i − p i i > 0. Then for generic valuations and relevances there exists r 1 > 0 such that no advertiser has an incentive to deviate from the pre-exploration symmetric Nash equilibrium bids once exploration is added. Any r 1 satisfying the following set of conditions is sufficient:
Appendix E contains the proof of this theorem.
Learning Bounds for Ad-Dependent Constant Slot Ratios
We can also prove analogous learning bounds in this setting and show that it is only necessary to explore via adjacent-ad swapping in order to obtain CTR estimates for all advertisers at all slots. Again, let n i,s denote the number of times we have observed advertiser i in slot s at the current fixed CTR estimates, and let z i,s,j be a random variable indicating whether or not the ad i was clicked on the j th time it appeared in slot s. 
Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability 1 − δ, for all advertisers i and slots s,
The proof is somewhat more involved than the proofs of the analogous Theorems 3 and 8, and appears in Appendix F.
Dealing with Continuous Context Information
A keyword entered by a user is just one of many characteristics of the broad context in which advertisements are displayed. In general, the CTR of an ad could depend heavily on other contextual information, such as the searcher's gender or location or the time of day [6, 14] . Our approach is directly applicable in settings in which the user may submit separate bids for each context [5] . However, it is not clear whether these results apply in general when the context contains features with very large or even continuous domains, or when bids cannot be conditioned on context. Since the presence of such features is quite common, we now briefly explain how parts of our analysis can be generalized to this setting.
For the remainder of the discussion, we will focus on the scenario in which the subspace of contextual features is continuous, and assume that advertisers are not able to condition their bids on context. We denote the specific realized context by x and let X be the set of all possible contexts that can arise. We assume that the only effect that a particular context x has is on the click-through rates and, consequently, make these functions of context for all slots and players. Thus, c s i (x) now denotes the click-through rate of player i in slot s when context is realized to x. As before, we assume that for each player i for each x, c s i (x) > c t i (x) whenever 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K, and define c s i (x) = 0 for s > K. For the moment, we do not commit to any specific ranking policy that the search engine will follow, but note rather that the effect of the ranking policy will be localized to the expected CTRs and prices that the bidders will actually face. Given the particular ranking of advertisers, an advertiser i will pay some price, p s i (x) for appearing in (or switching to) slot s, and the expected price (with respect to the distribution over context) of bidder i induced by the ranking policy is denoted by p i (x, b) .
Let b denote the entire profile of advertiser bids and b −i the profile of bids of all players other than i. The expected utility of the advertiser i can then be written as To guide exploration in the setting with context, we introduce the exploration function, r 1 (x), which is the probability that the bidder in slot 1 will be swapped down, analogous to the scheme we proposed above. To guide the exploration parameters of the remaining slots, we can use the fixed multipliers α s exactly in the same manner as we have done until now: that is, we let r s (x) = α s r 1 (x). Thus, we have only one parameter to control throughout exploration, albeit this "parameter" can now be a function of context. As before, we use c s i (x) to denote the effective CTR during exploration, which can be expressed as
It is easy to see that context changes nothing in terms of maintaining equilibria during exploration: our scheme above can be applied directly. 2 What it complicates is the analysis of bounds on the incentives to deviate of omniscient advertisers as well as the analysis of revenue loss due to exploration. We now address these questions to a limited degree.
Bound on Incentives of "Omniscient" Advertisers
First, we present a bound on the incentives that advertisers may have to deviate if they know their CTRs exactly. Fix b −i (e.g., to equilibrium b * −i ) and suppose that the bidders were in equilibrium before exploration. The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix G. To gain some intuition about the bound, note that v i E x∼D [ĉ 1 i (x)] is the expected value that advertiser would get by appearing in the first slot, providing the strongest incentive for advertisers to deviate. The other reason for advertisers to deviate is to reduce the payments; hence, the payment upper bound,p, in the expression. Finally, the more accurate the advertisers' information about CTRs (as quantified by in the expression), the less effective our scheme of maintaining equilibria will be.
Theorem 11 Suppose
As we can see, the conditions in Theorem 11 are very strong. A natural question then arises: Are there reasonable settings in which the bound would be of value? In the next section, we demonstrate that under relatively mild assumptions, the key condition that E x∼D [p i (x, b) ] ≤p is satisfied in generalized second-price auctions under the ranking rules of the kind we considered throughout this paper.
Weighted Ranking Rules in Generalized Second-Price Auctions
Suppose that for any context x ∈ X the bidders are ranked by the product of their weight, w i (x), and bid b i . If the bidder i is ranked in slot s, then the generalized second-price auction rules will charge the price of
We are interested in determining whether the expectation of p i (x, b) is finite for every bidder. That there is indeed such an upper bound should be rather intuitive: as long as p i (x, b) attains a maximum on the context domain X, this maximum can serve as the desired upper bound. A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of this upper bound is the subject of the following theorem.
Theorem 12
Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. w i (x) are continuous on X for every advertiser i, 2. w i (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X and for every i, 3. X is compact.
Furthermore, suppose that b −i is fixed. Then there existsp < ∞ such that E x [p i (x, b)] ≤p for all b i and for every advertiser i.
Proof To begin, observe that
Consequently,
Since w t (x) is continuous for all t, so is w max (x) = max t =i w t (x). Furthermore, since w i (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X, the ratio w ratio (x) = w max (x)/w i (x) is also continuous on X. Now, since X is compact and w ratio (x) is continuous on X, there exists W = max x∈X w ratio (x) < ∞ by the Weierstrass theorem. Thus, we can bound the expected payment of bidder i:
By settingp = W max t =i b t and observing that it does not depend on b i , we obtain the desired result.
Bound on Expected Revenue Loss Due to Exploration
A final question we address in the continuous context setting is the bound on how much revenue will be lost by the search engine while the exploration is taking place. For this bound, we assume as above that the bidders maintain their equilibrium bids b * during exploration. If not, revenue loss can be quite unpredictable, since it is unclear in what ways the bidders will change their bids once out of equilibrium (and a new equilibrium adjustment process, even if convergent, may be quite long). Recall that N is the total number of advertisers bidding on the keyword.
Theorem 13
Suppose that the players maintain their equilibrium bids b * during exploration. Then revenue loss due to exploration is bounded by
Proof Let φ(s)(x, b * ) denote the player that receives slot s when context is x and let us partition the context space as X = X s 1 ∪· · ·∪X s N , where X s i is the set of realizations of x such that advertiser i gets slot s. Then
The third line above yields an upper bound by simply removing the negative terms from the expression. The fourth uses the fact thatrᾱ is the upper bound on the exploration probability. The fifth step uses the fact that CTR is just a probability of a click and is therefore at most one.
Conclusion
We introduced an exploration scheme that allows search engines to learn clickthrough rates for advertisements. We showed how, when possible, to set the exploration parameters in order to eliminate the incentives for advertisers to deviate from a pre-exploration symmetric Nash equilibrium. In situations in which we cannot entirely eliminate incentives to change bids, we can make the gain for changing bids small enough to ensure that bid manipulation is hardly worth advertisers' efforts. Finally, we derived a bound on worst-case expected per-impression revenue loss due to exploration. Since this loss is zero in the limit of no exploration, we can set exploration parameters in order to make it arbitrarily small, while still ensuring that we eventually learn click-through rates. The analysis in this paper leaves open a number of interesting questions. For example, we do not address methods of setting the k-swap parameters in order to optimize various trade-offs between revenue loss and information gain. Additionally, the analysis of the continuous-context setting presented in Sect. 9 is far from complete. As it is becoming more and more clear that contextual information can significantly effect click-through rate, a complete analysis of exploration in this setting would be of great value.
The first condition,
ensures that r i + r i−k ≤ 1 for all i. The other two conditions are the subject of Lemmas 1 and 2 below.
Incentives of 1, . . . , K to Switch to Alternate Ranks in 1, . . . , K We first verify that players i ∈ {1, . . . , K} do not want to switch to alternate ranks j ∈ {1, . . . , K}. The following lemma gives conditions to guarantee this. Recall that we define c 0 1 = 0 and α 0 = 0. 
Lemma 1 Assume that the condition
where J i,j is as defined in (1).
Proof To ensure that players in slots 1, . . . , K do not have incentive to switch to other slots within this range, we need the condition
to be satisfied for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Using the definition r i = α i r 1 and rearranging terms, we obtain the equivalent condition
Under our assumption, the right hand side of (B.3) is always strictly positive. When J i,j ≤ 0, any r 1 ∈ [0, 1] satisfies the condition we need. When J i,j > 0, we need to guarantee
Therefore, we must have for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that J i,j > 0
Incentive of Players 1, . . . , K to Move to Ranks
The previous lemma showed that the K highest ranked advertisers do not have incentive to deviate to another rank between 1 and K when exploration is added under certain conditions. We now consider the conditions that guarantee that these advertisers do not want to move to a rank greater than K.
Lemma 2
If the players are in a symmetric Nash equilibrium with v i > p i i whenever Z i > 0 before exploration and if
where Z i is defined as in (2) Proof We show that any player i ∈ {1, . . . , K} has no incentive to deviate to any slot j ∈ {K + 1, . . . , N}. For any j ∈ {K + 1, . . . , N}, in order to guarantee that player i does not want to switch to slot j , the following condition must hold:
As we require that this condition hold simultaneously for all j , it becomes equivalent to
Since v i − p i i > 0, the right hand side of (B.4) is strictly positive. When Z i ≤ 0, the constraint is satisfied trivially. Thus we need only that when Z i > 0, Proof Since the set of advertisers K + 1, . . . , N received no clicks in the preexploration symmetric Nash equilibrium, we know that it must be the case that for all i and j such that
In other words, these advertisers have a value per click that is lower than the equilibrium price per click of any slot between 1 and K. When exploration is added, the CTRs of these slots might change, but the price is still higher than these advertisers' values. Thus the advertisers still are not interested in these slots when exploration is added.
Note that we have not addressed the incentives for players K + 1, . . . , N to deviate to other ranks K + 1 or higher. This case will depend on the way in which the distribution q i is chosen. There are many possible choices for which players K + 1, . . . , N will not have incentive to swap ranks among themselves.
Appendix C: Proof of Player 1's Strict Preference at SNE
The following theorem is briefly mentioned in Sect. 8.1. Here we state the result formally and provide a very simple proof.
Theorem 14 Suppose that the players are playing a minimum symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then for generic valuations and relevances
For generic valuations and relevances,
) and we recover the desired strict inequality.
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 7
To begin, note that by defining α i to be
we obtain the following recursive expression for r i :
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , K}. This setting of probabilities is convenient because the CTRs of an ad in slots 2, . . . , K do not change when exploration is added if bids do not change, as shown in the following useful lemma. 
Lemma 4 When
The next lemma provides a simple and intuitive result for generic valuations and relevances.
Lemma 5 In a symmetric Nash equilibrium with
w i v i ≥ w i+1 v i+1 , w i v i > w i+1 b i+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ K for generic
valuations and relevances.
Proof Suppose w i v i ≤ w i+1 b i+1 for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}. For j > 1, the following upper bound on w j b j holds in a symmetric Nash equilibrium (a simple extension of Varian [11, 15] ):
where β j = c j /c j −1 < 1. From the above bound with j = i + 1 and the assumption that w i v i ≤ w i+1 b i+1 , it follows that
and, therefore w i v i ≤ w i+2 b i+2 . Applying the bound in (D.6) again with j = i + 2, we see that 
But this is a contradiction, since player i would then want to switch to slot K + 1, whereas we assumed that all bidders were in a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, v i > p i i for all players i when CTRs are factorable.
Given Lemma 4, note that if none of the bidders in slots 2, . . . , N wanted to move up to slot 1 in equilibrium before exploration, they have even less incentive to do so once exploration is added since the effective CTR for slot 1 is now lower and the effective CTR of their own slots is the same by our definition of α i . Furthermore, none of the bidders in slots 2, . . . , N want to switch to alternate slots in 2, . . . , K since the effective CTRs are now the same for all of these slots and do not depend on the bidder's identity due to the factorization assumption. Consequently, we need only examine whether or not the top bidder wants to move down, or whether any bidder might like to move into a slot below K. The analysis of these cases is directly analogous to the analysis in the proof of Theorem 2, and the sufficient conditions on r 1 are derived in the same manner.
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 9
This proof is very similar to the proofs of Theorem 2 and 7. In fact, the incentives for player 1 and players K, K + 1, . . . , N can be analyzed exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2, and the conditions on r 1 follow from this analysis as before. Thus here we focus only on the incentives of players 2, . . . , K − 1. which is equivalent to the symmetric equilibrium condition before exploration and thus holds by assumption. For deviation to slot 1, note that 2 /γ i ≤ 0, and the right-hand side is at most 0. Since the left-hand side is at least 0 (otherwise our assumption of equilibrium prior to exploration does not hold), any r 1 satisfies the condition.
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 10
The proof is divided into a sequence of lemmas. The first one, stated below, follows from a direct application of Hoeffding's inequality and the union bound. Recall that s i is a chosen slot to explore for ad i. Since this bound is independent of b i , it is uniform on b i ∈ R.
By Lemma 12, then, we have that
We have assumed that the players' bids are in equilibrium prior to exploration. Consequently, the bid b i of advertiser i prior to exploration maximizes U i . Let us denote by b i the bid which accrues to i the maximum utility under the new effective CTR. Then, the maximum benefit that i gains from deviating under the new CTR is |U i (b i ) − U i (b i )|. By Lemma 11, we double the bound of Lemma 12 to make it the upper bound on the maximal benefit to deviation for player i, keeping the bids of other advertisers constant:
This yields the desired result.
